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After a brief overview of recent research on early helping, outlining some central problems,
and issues, this paper examines children’s early helping through the lens of Piagetian
moral and developmental theory, drawing on Piaget’s “Moral Judgment of the Child”
(Piaget, 1932/1997), “Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood” (Piaget, 1945/1951), and
the “Grasp of Consciousness” (Piaget, 1976). Piaget refers to a level of moral development
in action that precedes heteronomous and autonomous moral reasoning. This action
level allows children to begin to interact with people and objects. In his later work,
Piaget explores the gradual construction of understanding from this activity level. Taken
together, these elements of Piagetian theory provide a promising conceptual framework
for understanding the development of early helping.
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Young children begin to help others soon after their ﬁrst birth-
day (Warneken and Tomasello, 2007). In the lab, toddlers will
assist adults who have encountered a variety of problems, with a
progression of helping behaviors. Children’s earliest form of help-
ing, appearing as early as 14 months (Warneken and Tomasello,
2007), is often called instrumental helping, as it involves aiding
an adult complete a thwarted goal, such as retrieving a dropped
object, or opening a door (e.g., Warneken and Tomasello, 2006;
Svetlova et al., 2010; Dunﬁeld et al., 2011). Early in the second
year of life, children begin to display empathic helping, which
is oriented at relieving those in distress, such as providing a
blanket to someone who is cold. Closer to 30 months of age,
children also begin to show altruistic helping, which involves shar-
ing and distributing resources, including those belonging to the
child (e.g., loaning a favorite toy). In many traditional models of
prosocial behavior, these forms of helping would be attributed to
skills such as emotion understanding and perspective taking. Yet
developmentally, the appearance of early helping precedes these
forms of complex social emotional understanding, leaving the
emergence of help, its developmental trends, and sources of indi-
vidual differences poorly understood (Svetlova et al., 2010; Paulus,
2014).
Doubtlessly, some of the difﬁculties in understanding early
help are conceptual. Help is a term of natural language, not a
technical or psychological term, and does not have a precise psy-
chological correlate. Helping can involve many different actions
and situations, ranging from doing something explicitly requested
or commanded (e.g., “Can you hand me that hammer?”; “Come
here!”) to doing something that we feel is another’s interest (e.g.,
opening a door for someone coming into a building behind us;
assisting someone who is hurt). As Paulus (2014) remarks, help-
ing in these situations could involve a plethora of psychological
skills, despite the superﬁcial unity implied by the word “help.”
There is also a moral connotation to the term help, which again
may or may not apply to the particulars of a situation. In the lab,
helping opportunities are generally structured such that children’s
participation is prosocial. But in real life, assisting another achieve
a goal (e.g., retrieving car keys for someone who is drunk) is not
always the right thing to do. Furthermore, help can be in the eye
of the beholder; for example, a parent’s decision to prevent their
child from playing video games, even if aimed at assisting the child
achieve in school, may go unappreciated by the child. The issue
of perspective may be important to the development of helping,
as young children’s assistance in routines and chores in the home,
although often unhelpful to parents, slowing down and stymying
their efforts, is also regarded by many parents as worthy of encour-
aging and supporting (Rheingold, 1982; Hammond and Brownell,
2014).
Despite the unresolved complexities that surround the concept
of help, recent studies on early helping have many raised ques-
tions about human evolution, development, and morality. For
some, the early appearance of helping could suggest – in the sense
of behavioral ontogeny recapitulating behavioral phylogeny – that
human cooperativeness emerged at an earlier evolutionary time
(Warneken and Tomasello, 2009). This would suggest that a pre-
dominant view of human nature as selﬁsh is misguided (Hay,
2009). The precocity of helping also raises questions about how
it is learned. Although socialization seems like a plausible route,
Warneken and Tomasello (2013) found that instrumental helping
is not inﬂuenced by social praise and reinforcement. Further-
more, they argue that because young children are unlikely to
encounter situations where an adult needs their help in the home,
they have few opportunities to learn about helping. Instead, it
seems that “very young children have a natural tendency to help
other persons solve their problems” (Warneken and Tomasello,
2006, p. 1302). With evolutionary roots and early, unexplained,
appearance, helping seems to be a good candidate for the larger
movement in developmental psychology that posits infants possess
some elements of an innate morality (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2007;
Bloom, 2012).
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However,Warneken and Tomasello’s (2006) argument relies on
a relatively narrow view of learning, one that omits situations in
which children apply skills learned in one context to other con-
texts. Hebb et al. (1971) call this latter form of learned behavior,
behavior “that is not learned, but is dependent on prior learning”
(p. 213). Although no one has systematically investigated the fre-
quencywithwhich adults encounter problems that require a child’s
aid, children clearly can and do get involved in helping their par-
ents in the home (Rheingold, 1982; Hay, 2009). The social ecology
of the home reveals a rich context in which children could develop
skills that may allow them to offer instrumental help, i.e., helping
in a situation where an adult encounters a problem, even if they
have never encountered this particular situation outside the lab.
Unfortunately for parents, and in contrast with the view that
children come into the world biologically prepared to help oth-
ers, young children’s “help” is often less than helpful. One- and
2-year-olds’ involvement in activities in the home often involves
interfering with whatever their parents are doing, smearing spills
instead of wiping them up, or setting clean dishes from the dish-
washer on the ﬂoor. Many young children insist that they be
allowed to assist with these activities, and may grow angry if they
are excluded (Forman, 2007). Children’s “uncooperative coop-
erativeness” leads many parents to wait until their children are
napping to take care of household tasks (Rheingold, 1982). But,
parents also report that they want to have their children take part
in this help, as, in the words of one mother, “it is usually unhelp-
ful and makes everything take longer, but she loves learning new
things and it is my job as mommy to teach her all of these things”
(Hammond and Brownell, 2014). Eventually, children do learn to
help in the home. As diary and ethnographic studies show, young
children can come to play important, and genuinely helpful, roles
in the home and larger community (e.g., Rogoff, 2003; Hay, 2009).
However, children also come lose their zeal for some of these tasks,
and must be coaxed to do chores and help their parents, suggesting
developmental changes in motivation.
How can these diverse pictures of children’s early helping, of
children as natural altruists and unhelpful helpers, be reconciled?
At this juncture in research on early helping, there may be value
in revisiting an older theory of moral development for a better
understanding of early helping. The recent trend in developmen-
tal research towards innate morality is in some ways a pushback
against the seminal work of Piaget (1932/1997), whose explo-
rations of morality are largely restricted to later childhood (e.g.,
Hamlin, 2013). The reaction against Piaget’s inﬂuence, which has
occurred in many other areas of developmental psychology (e.g.,
object knowledge; numerical cognition; social cognition, etc.), has
had the positive effect of demonstrating that many phenomena
appear earlier in the lifespan than expected (Hay, 2009). How-
ever, these efforts to frame early helping as unlearned, and infant
morality as largely equivalent to its adult forms, risk missing out
on the unique developmental features of early helping, which are
particularly evident in observations of children in the home, and
the developmental trends in helping such as the transition from
instrumental to empathic and altruistic helping.
Although early helping clearly precedes the period of moral-
ity that Piaget was particularly interested in, the broad features of
the Piagetian developmental program, which focuses on change
and transformation, may be able to make some positive contribu-
tions to the study of early helping, highlighting features of early
helping that have been overlooked and presenting some revised
expectations about its emergence and subsequent development.
In particular, Piaget’s theory, which is at its heart an account of
how knowledge emerges from action (Chapman, 1988), may have
something to say about how children manage to begin to help
others before they have develop complex social cognitive repre-
sentations. The present paper will draw on a few elements Piaget’s
works, namely his early works the Moral Judgment of the Child
(Piaget, 1932/1997) and Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood
(Piaget, 1945/1951), and his later work on the transition from
action to reﬂective cognition, the Grasp of Consciousness (Piaget,
1976), to explore the emergence of early helping, the transition to
more complex forms of helping, and what may happen to helping
in later development.
BEFORE MORALITY REASONING: THE EMERGENCE OF EARLY
HELPING
At ﬁrst glance, Piaget’s moral developmental theory, which is
largely focused on children aged 5 to 12, has little to contribute
to the study of early helping, which occurs in the ﬁrst few years
of life. Furthermore, in the opening line of the Moral Judg-
ment of the Child, Piaget (1932/1997) declares that he offers, “no
direct analysis of child morality as it is practiced in home and
school life” (p. 10). Instead, his moral theory unfolds as a cri-
tique of the prominent moral education theory of sociologist
Émile Durkheim (Durkheim, 1925/1961; Fedi, 2008). Whereas
Durkheim saw morality and moral rules thrust on the child by
adult society, Piaget countered that this was only one part of the
story. Adults’ unilateral exertion of rules on the child resulted in
the child developing a heteronomous understanding of morality,
where moral rules and norms were unchangeable and externally
regulated through punishment. Piaget argued that children were
also exposed to a different societal structure through social inter-
actions with peers, characterized by a rough equivalence of power,
and which lead to the development of an autonomous under-
standing of morality, where moral rules and norms could be
constructed and negotiated in social interaction through a coordi-
nation of perspectives (Carpendale, 2009). Interestingly, despite
their disagreements, both Durkheim (1888/1970) and Piaget
found the idea that humans were born with innate knowledge
deeply implausible.
Piaget (1932/1997) used the example of children learning the
game of marbles, a social game with manifold rules (and a
widespread popularity in his day and age) as a proxy for learning
moral rules. As children develop, they begin to understand that
the rules of marbles and morals are not unchangeable, handed
down from generation to generation, but are living and breathing
systems used to coordinate social interaction with others, and can
be negotiated and changed. But, before children learn to think and
reason about the rules of marbles, they must actually learn how
to play marbles. And analogously, before children can learn to
think about morals, they must actually engage in morally relevant
activity. Piaget acknowledges from the outset that the practice and
consciousness of morality is different, and, importantly, that the
former emerges before the latter (p. 14). Even though the bulk
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of Piaget’s system of moral development is focused on moral rea-
soning, it is rooted in the practice of moral activity (Carpendale,
2009).
Piaget’s recognition that there is moral practice before complex
moral representations transforms one of the developmental mys-
teries of children’s early helping. As Svetlova et al. (2010) remark,
the central problem of early helping is how children manage to
engage in it before they have developed advanced forms of social
cognition and social understanding. But in a Piagetian account,
this is precisely what we would expect to happen: young chil-
dren should begin to learn some aspects of helping before the
appearance of complex mental representations. For Piaget, moral
development begins in a “stage of a purely motor and individual
character. . . [leading to] the formation of more or less ritual-
ized schemas” (Piaget, 1932/1997, p. 26). The child is learning to
interact with objects, and people, in the world, and organize this
action.
It should be noted that Piaget uses the term individual, and
social, in a somewhat idiosyncratic way (Chapman, 1988). Piaget’s
point is that the child’s early moral interactions are not entirely
social, or not social in the same way that older children are social
(Carpendale, 2009). Piaget (1932/1997) observes the child oper-
ating “in an individualistic manner with material that is social”
(p. 37). By this he means that children’s interactions often reﬂect
their own interests, rather than reﬂecting the goal of the other.
Although children are using the same objects as others (e.g., mar-
bles), and interacting with others to some extent, in other ways
their interactions are quite different than mature forms. Chil-
dren are learning to engage in some aspects of the regularity of
organized practices, but they do not understand these practices’
larger goals. We could expect, transposing the theory to early help-
ing that children may develop skills such as cleaning with others
without a fully developed understanding of why these tasks are
being accomplished, and of course with far more limited motor
skills.
As children master the basic motor aspects of activities, they
possess only a limited understanding of the greater context of
these activities. As Piaget (1932/1997) puts it, these early interac-
tions“may be called egocentric... the child imitates... without trying
to win [i.e., the game of marbles]” (p. 27). Transposing the point
about winning a game to the context of early helping, the child can
be involved in activities without a good knowledge of their greater
goal (e.g., play with marbles without understanding what it is to
win a game of marbles; wipe a table with a cloth without under-
standing the goal of cleaning up the house). This ﬁts with parental
reports that children’s helping is not always helpful (Rheingold,
1982). The child is capable of participating in some aspects of the
task alongside their parents, but they do not necessary have a full
understanding of the goals of the task at hand.
In fact the child’s own version of the task may be quite eccen-
tric. As one parent describes the process of doing laundry with
her child, “[w]hen helping to fold laundry she often just wads it
up into little balls. I try and show her the right way which lasts
all of three items before she’s back to wadding them up again”
(Hammond and Brownell, 2014). For a young child, collaborative
helping opportunities, like putting away laundry, is a sort of game,
one in which they may ﬁxate on particularly enjoyable aspects, to
the detriment of the task as a whole. The child is clearly able to
take part in most aspect of the task at hand in isolation (e.g., move
dirty laundry into the washing machine). But systematically, their
understanding of how actions should be coordinated within the
task is such that their help is unlikely to be helpful, without heavy
management from parents.
Children’s unconventional manner of helping is rarely
remarked upon in lab-based studies of children’s early helping.
This may be because helping tasks in the lab are structured to
rely largely on isolated components of helping, in such a way in
that they artiﬁcially make the child seem more competent than
they really are (Carpendale et al., 2013). In these studies, chil-
dren are required to carry out relatively modest acts, e.g., pick
up a dropped object and return it to someone’s hand. This task is
explicitly structured so that if the said act is performed, it is helpful
to the adult.
In the motor and individualistic aspects of early moral devel-
opment, Piaget (1932/1997) also alights on some unique devel-
opmental aspects of early moral development, which is the joy
children express as they come to engage in regular and ritualized
interactions (p. 33). Rheingold (1982) describes children’s early
helping as marked by “alacrity,” engaging in “quick and energetic
movements, excited vocal intonations, animated facial expres-
sions, and with delight in the ﬁnished task” (p. 119). Again, this
feature of children’s early helping, though present in the subjects
of contemporary lab-based studies of children’s early helping, are
rarely remarked upon as an important feature of help in these
studies, which have largely been concerned with the outcome of
help (e.g., its presence and rapidity), and much less interested in
its process and character.
The recognition of children’s joy in helping stands in contrast
to a great deal of work in moral psychology and moral philosophy
that has emphasized that helping uniquely emerges from concern
and sadness (Wispé, 1991). As Adam Smith’s friend and fellow
philosopher David Hume pointed out long ago in a letter to Smith,
if shared misery is the basis of our moral interactions with others,
thenmoralitywould play awholly onerous role in human existence
(Ross, 1995, p. 179). Developmentally, it is unclear how morality
would develop if children could learn about it only in situations
of pain and distress. Extending Warneken and Tomasello’s (2006)
argument, these distressing situations are probably relatively rare
in the child’s life to form a basis for learning to help. Children have
far more experience helping others in collaborative and playful
contexts, with shared joy and enjoyment (Brownell et al., 2002).
FROM INSTRUMENTAL HELP TO EMPATHIC
UNDERSTANDING: IMITATION AND SYMBOLIC
UNDERSTANDING
The picture presented by Piaget’s work on earlymorality is that of a
child learning to engage collaboratively with others, without a full
understanding of others’ goals. In the rest of the Moral Judgment,
Piaget largely leaves the early action level behind, turning instead
to how children understand rules in relations of heteronomy and
autonomy, an issue that lies beyond early helping, and will be
returned to brieﬂy below. However, we can turn elsewhere in the
corpus of his work to learn more about how early helping might
develop as children begin to reﬂect on helping.
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In Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood (Piaget,
1945/1951), Piaget provides many examples of children’s early
activity in the context of exploratory play. The imitation of peo-
ple has been accorded a great deal of importance in both recent
psychological literature, such as on mirror neurons (e.g., Key-
sers, 2009), and early learning (Paulus et al., 2011), as well as
in earlier sociological literature (e.g., Tarde, 1903). Piaget ﬁnds
many examples of children imitating others’ actions and activities,
such as modeling another person crossing their arms, or stamping
their feet. However, perhaps setting his work apart from the focus
on imitating other humans’ actions, Piaget’s work on imitation
acknowledges that children imitate both people and objects. For
example, Piaget (1945/1951) observes a 1-year-old child imitat-
ing “the sound of a rattling window and sway[ing] to the same
rhythm” (p. 66).
As such, Piaget is not referring to imitation as merely a type of
copying or mirroring, as a child cannot truly produce a copy of a
rattling window as they can a walking adult, but rather as a form
of learning by which they can integrate aspects of rattling win-
dow into their own repertoire of action. As children develop, they
can produce these imitations, with greater ease, and manipulating
them, reversing them, applying them in new situations and so on.
As children manipulate these action schemes, they can accomplish
a wide variety of tasks based on sensorimotor knowledge (i.e.,
practical knowledge) alone. This class of tasks would undoubt-
edly include helping others in many instrumental contexts. Young
children, by the age at which helping ﬁrst appears, have uncon-
testably experienced many of the components of helping others,
whether handing over objects, or opening doors, throughout their
lives. Indeed, and although Piaget badly underplayed the role of
observational learning in his action theory, they have been expe-
riencing and observing others handing objects to them for even
longer. Furthermore, in the context of his larger theory of sen-
sorimotor development, Piaget would clearly expect children to
be able to apply action schema (e.g., handing an object to some-
one) in new contexts and novel situations (e.g., after someone has
dropped it).
Piaget’s expectation that children have the ability to apply
action schema to new contexts is relevant to Warneken and
Tomasello’s (2006) argument that instrumental helping is likely
unlearned because problem contexts are so rare in the young
child’s life. As noted early, the helping paradigms in the lab
focus on problem situations where an adult feigns incapacita-
tion (e.g., that they are unable to reach a dropped object), which
the child has an opportunity to resolve. These types of situa-
tions may indeed be rare in children’s lives, and when children
encounter these situations in the lab, their help seems to come
from nowhere. But according to Piaget, just because certain sit-
uations are rare, or novel, for the life of the child, does not
necessarily mean that the child has no pertinent learning to
apply in this rare or novel context. Echoing Hebb et al. (1971)
view, Piaget would likely argue that children’s instrumental help-
ing is dependent on prior learning. A great deal of the earliest
instrumental helping, which involves returning dropped and out-
of-reach objects to the hands of an adult (e.g., Warneken and
Tomasello, 2007), could in principle be explained by this abil-
ity to quickly emulate, and reverse, the movement of people
and of the objects. The act of returning something to some-
one’s hand is something the child has likely seen, and experienced
themselves (e.g., when they have dropped their bowl of food),
many times, and is not particularly difﬁcult for a young child
to do.
That said, children encounter situations in which their prior
learning cannot aid them. A likely candidate seems to be empathic
helping, which appears later in the lifespan than instrumental
helping. Empathic helping occurs in situations such as someone
shivering with cold, and who needs a blanket (e.g., Svetlova et al.,
2010). In this type of scenario, young children clearly have the
requisite skills to lift and carry a blanket over to a shivering adult.
But how do they learn to connect the blanket to a person shiver-
ing? This helping situation is structured radically differently than
instrumental helping tasks. When a person is shivering, there is
no interaction between person and object. Instead the interaction
is situated only with the experimenter in their shivering. Shiver-
ing can be symbolically linked to needing a blanket, but there is
no direct interaction with this blanket. To solve the empathic task
at a stage where no interaction has taken place, the child must
recognize the meaning of someone shivering and its relation to a
blanket somewhere else in the room.
In experimental studies, should the child fail to initially retrieve
the blanket, the experimenter subsequently begins to reach for the
blanket. It is here that an imitatable interaction emerges, and this
also seems to be the point when younger children begin to retrieve
the blanket (Svetlova et al., 2010). Thus, the empathic forms of
helping may emerge later for children, not because they rely on
“hidden” emotions or mental states (after all, shivering is an overt
behavior), but because the emotional displays involved do not ini-
tially include a direct interaction between the experimenter and
object needed to solve the task, but rely on a more symbolic form
of understanding (“a blanket is for a person who is cold”; “a per-
son who is shivering is cold”). This relation between shivering and
a blanket is not apparent in the undifferentiated action context,
because there is no interaction between the person and the blan-
ket. Although it is possible “solve” empathic helping tasks with
sensorimotor skills, a far more elegant solution lies in the child
learning to understand the world more symbolically, explicitly
bringing actions (e.g., shivering) into relation with objects (e.g., a
blanket).
UNDERSTANDING HELPING OTHERS: THE GRASP OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
Piaget’s work suggests that children can learn to help with sen-
sory and motor skills. However, children eventually learn to
differentiate the world into self and other, object and person,
and gain more mentalistic and reﬂective skills. In the Grasp of
Consciousness, Piaget (1976) lays out that the process bywhich chil-
dren gain reﬂective understanding, as their practical knowledge is
reconstructed on a conscious plane, or level, of thought. This con-
scious reconstruction isn’t merely an “illumination” of what was
occurring on the plane of action, i.e., a direct isomorphism of
that activity, but a reconstruction that moves beyond what they
see in direct interaction, and thereby allows them to reorganize
their existing activity in more sophisticated ways (Campbell and
Bickhard, 1986).
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In Piaget’s account, reﬂective understanding arises ﬁrst in what
Piaget (1976) calls the periphery, and only gradually moving to
what he calls the center. In this somewhat misleading terminol-
ogy, the periphery refers to the site of interaction between subject
and object, whereas the center(s) refers to characteristics associ-
ated with the subject(s) and object(s) involved in the interaction.
Piaget assigns the terms periphery and center on the basis of their
importance to explaining causality, i.e., the characteristics of sub-
ject and object are centers in terms of a causal explanation of an
interaction, where the interaction itself only offers some periph-
eral aspects. Although Piaget lays out the periphery-center model
in the context of the child-as-subject interacting with some object,
there seems to be no reason why cognizance could not also involve
other subjects as other centers.
In this periphery-center model, children’s understanding will
ﬁrst form around aspects of interaction between object and sub-
ject, and only later begin to form around the properties of objects
and subjects contribute to these interactions. So for example, early
on, a child may understand that opening a door will allow toys to
be retrieved from a closet (an interaction), but the same child is
unlikely to understand the properties of the mechanisms of the
door (central characteristics of the object), nor successfully reﬂect
on how they learned to open the door (central characteristics of
the subject).
In that children focus on the periphery, i.e., the point of interac-
tion, Piaget’s work suggests that in the early stages of development,
children begin to understand objects and people in a relatively
undifferentiated way. When a child sees someone drop a pen they
likely approach the situation holistically, understand something
about people and pens, i.e., that pens belong in a hand, rather
than segmenting the situation into one inwhich theymust read the
mind of the other. The child’s knowledge begins with interactions
between people and objects (e.g., a marker falling out of some-
one’s hand). These are only later constructed into differentiated
knowledge about objects (e.g., blankets can make people warm)
and subjects (e.g., shivering means cold) proper. The fact that
early practical knowledge blends subject and object in interaction
means that children do not a priori distinguish people/minds as
one form of knowledge, and objects and things as another (Bibok
et al., 2008). However, research on children’s early helping, like so
much of psychology, has ﬁxated on the problem of other minds,
such that one part of the reason we are surprised by the precocity
of children’s early helping is that we presuppose that this helping
must involve a knowledge of other minds, rather than framing the
issue as skills in interaction.
If this principle of periphery to center is applied to the context
of helping, children would be expected to ﬁrst understand aspects
of interaction, such as retrieving a dropped object and placing
it in the hand of an experimenter, long before they understand
the central social cognitive questions of why the experimenter was
unable to retrieve the dropped object. Nearly all lab-based instru-
mental helping tasks are structured with peripheral components,
such as an experimenter with an arm full of books bumping up
against a door he or she cannot open. Only later will children
be able to differentiate and reﬂect on the more central aspects of
helping, such as the larger goals and capacities and needs of the
helpee.
One recent study of helping in slightly older children shows
that with development, children’s helping seems to become more
attuned to discriminate when someone actually needs help ver-
sus someone who is capable of solving the problem on their own
(Paulus and Moore, 2011). In the home, this restriction to the
peripheral may explain why children can initially carry out many
of the components of helping, e.g., picking up laundry, even if
they do not understand their parents’ larger goals, nor quite see
some important characteristics of the objects involved (e.g., dirty
vs. clean clothes). As children develop, they may learn to reﬂect on
these more central aspects. Interestingly, and in what is an impor-
tant point of future longitudinal investigation, this may mean that
children help less as they get older, even as they become more
competent helpers.
DIFFERENTIATING HELP: FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF
CHILDREN’S EARLY HELPING
The literature on children’s early helping has thus far largely
focused on the presence of help, rather than individual differ-
ences. In reviewing Piaget’s moral theory, an important point
to address, and correct, is the role that Piaget sees for parent–
child social interaction in moral development, and how this might
be a source of these differences. Piaget is somewhat infamous
for emphasizing the deleterious role of parent in moral devel-
opment. However, Piaget’s characterization of adult society as
being detrimental to the development morality was in fact an
emphasis on an ideal type of authoritarian parenting (Vidal,
1998). Piaget did not programmatically view parental involve-
ment as necessarily injurious to the children’s moral development
(Carpendale, 2009).
A more serious lacunae in Piaget’s model of social devel-
opment was his tendency to generally downplay the content
of early interactions, and the way in which these expose chil-
dren to skills in a variety of social and cultural contexts (e.g.,
caring for children; preparing food). Instead, Piaget largely
focused on the power structure of these interactions, in so far
as these promoted obligation or mutual respect (Moessinger,
2008). These structural issues may be important in terms of the
quality of parent-child interactions, such as scaffolding, which
may provide a route to explaining individual differences in chil-
dren’s helping (Pettygrove et al., 2013). Nevertheless, Piaget’s
writing on early moral development leaves room for profound
parental inﬂuences on children’s early helping activities, as par-
ents socialize and introduce the child to a variety of different
practices (Grusec et al., 2013). Parents, and social institutions,
provide opportunities for children to learn a wide variety of
skills. As Rogoff (2003) remarks, in some cultures, young
children are trained in skills, such as using machetes to cut
food, that but seem almost mind-boggling dangerous in Western
society.
Beyond the issue of the types helping children become proﬁ-
cient in, there is the issue of the connection between this early
form of moral behavior and later moral development. In Piaget’s
theory, aspects of children’s early helping behavior will become
conceptualized by the child and become part of the child’s moral
understanding. Here we may expect further individual differences.
The joy that children display in early helping, their enthusiasm and
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insistence to get involved in the tasks of adults, changes in structure
and motivation in early and middle childhood. Following Piaget’s
theory of moral development, children may come to conceptu-
alize certain forms of helping heteronomously and imposed by
obligation. So a chore, such as vacuuming, which was interesting
when the child was delighted in the action of pushing the vacuum
might becomes something they feel forced to do. But children may
come to understand other forms of helping differently, particularly
if these are negotiated in a relation of respect and caring for the
other. An example of this sort of helping might be feeding the
family pet.
CONCLUSION
In this brief ﬁrst pass, Piaget’s theory offers some interesting
avenues to rethink some of the major problems facing research
on children’s early helping. In the Piagetian account, children
should be expected to begin to help before the formation of
complex mental representations (Svetlova et al., 2010). How-
ever, this early helping will also be characterized by properties
such as enthusiasm and unhelpful helping that we would not
expect of its mature forms (Rheingold, 1982). Piagetian theory
also suggests a way to resolve Warneken and Tomasello’s (2006)
view that children’s help in problem situations cannot be learned
because these situations are so rare in the child’s life. The Piage-
tian concept of learning would allow children’s skills learned
in one context to transfer to novel contexts (e.g., a problem
scenario).
Piaget’s action theory suggests some developmental expecta-
tions for why certain forms of helping are more difﬁcult for
children than others. Early on, children are best able to under-
stand interactions (e.g., someone reaching for a dropped marker),
only later do they begin to be able to understand more disas-
sociated aspects of helping (e.g., someone shivering with cold).
The types of practical activities the child is exposed to by both
their parent and culture may form the basis of their early help-
ing. Finally, Piaget’s theory suggests how children might come to
understand their help in different ways, and with different conse-
quences, depending on whether they view this help in the context
of obligation or mutual respect.
In her own seminal work on early helping, Rheingold (1982)
wonderedwhether the“attributionof the terms‘sharing,’‘comfort-
ing,’ or ‘helping’ to very young children may appear unjustiﬁed to
those who wish to reserve the terms for persons old enough to ver-
balize their intentions and... be explicitly aware of their motives”
(p. 114). As he did with other developmental phenomena, Piaget
would likely give a developmental answer, rather than a clear-cut
yes or no (e.g., Piaget and Inhelder, 1966) and suggest that chil-
dren’s early helping may be only the ﬁrst step of a much longer
journey.
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